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INTRODUCTION
Rules are meant to be (conveniently) followed. The Rules Enabling Act was a
legislative effort to promote efficiency within the judicial process, by enabling the
Court to employ rules of practice so that a justice-oriented, systematic court process
may be achieved. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("F.R.C.P") were
adopted by Congress and implemented in the federal court system.2 The Federal
Rules epitomize a dramatic shift from common law to establish a more effective
approach for federal court proceedings. Despite the drafters' incomplete efforts to
secede from traditional code systems, the Federal Rules restructured civil litigation
to further the democratic ideals of an accessible justice system where adjudication
*Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A. Political Science and B.F.A. Dance,
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 2009. Many thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his guidance and
encouragement during the planning stages of this Note, the members of Notre Dame's Journal of Legislation
for their diligent editing and Marcus Bach-Armas, Laura Crylen and Kevin Xu for their comments and
support. I would also like to extend a heartfelt thank you to my family, especially my parents, brothers and
sister as well as my friends for their continuous love, patience, and support.
1. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
2. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1677, 1708-09 (2004).
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is based on the merits rather than technicalities. The pleading standard 3 illustrates a
break from code pleading to simplified pleading,4 where the standard facilitated a
means to justice through openness, ease, and efficiency5 rather than mastering "a
game of skill." 6
In curtailing the procedural barriers, the success of the F.R.C.P. partly lies in
the drafter's reliance on plain language.7 The dependence on ordinary text
illustrates that the Federal Rules ought to be enforced to ensure the "equality of
treatment [and opportunity] of all parties and claims in the civil adjudication
process." 8  The emphasis on openness, transparency, and predictability enabled
civil litigation to expand within the public sector by targeting government oversight
and advocating public policies through claims of conspiracy, discrimination, and
toxic tort actions.
Throughout the twentieth century, pleadings were the driving force in ensuring
that the drafters' original intentions9 became a reality. In Conley v. Gibson,10 the
Supreme Court solidified and, arguably, broadened the pleading standard set forth
in the Federal Rules. The decision upheld that a "fair notice" approach to pleading
was sufficient because discovery and other pretrial procedures provided appropriate
mechanisms to reveal the precise nature of claims and to narrow disputed facts and
issues prior to trial. I
In the early 1990s the Supreme Court became progressively more reluctant to
advocate an individual's right to trial absent limitation.12 With increasing litigation
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
4. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of]934, 130 U. PA. L. REV 1015 (1982); Stephen
B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of 'General Rules, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 535 (2009).
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
6. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.").
7. See Peter Julian, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a "Formalism of Generality,"
Under the Federal Rules, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 1179, 1195 (2010) (considering that the Federal Rules were
influenced by philosophical ideals, such as permitting any person to put his claim before the judge and judges
will place truth ahead of cleverness and tactics in deciding the validity of the case); see also Arthur R. Miller,
From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1,
4-5 (2010) ("Federal Rules created a system that relied on plain language and minimized procedural traps,
with trial by jury as the gold standard for determining a case's merits.").
8. See Miller, supra note 7, at 5 ("This idea was a baseline democratic tenet of the 1930s and then of
postwar America with regard to such matters as civil rights, the distribution of social and political power,
marketplace status, and equality of opportunity.").
9. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened
Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 554, 559 (2002) (arguing that Dioguardi is a prime example that illustrates
drafters' intentions, where the case reinforces that the rule only requires "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief').
10. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
11. Id. at 47-48; Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Issue Brief, Restoring Access to Justice: The Impact
oflqbal and Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. & POL'Y 3 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Civin and Adegbile issue brief final (9-14-10).pdf [hereinafter Civin &
Adegible].
12. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 1039, 1039 (1993) ("[T]he Supreme Court has become increasingly fond of
using the plain meaning doctrine to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
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costs, discovery expenses, and the dramatic rise of corporate parties, the privilege to
use the federal court system to seek justice transformed into a burden,13 where
strike suits and abusive litigation became more common. As a result, pretrial
procedures became progressively more arduous as issues and stakes expanded with
complexity and volume.14 Accordingly, the Supreme Court responded.
In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly15  and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,16 the
significance of these Supreme Court decisions materialized the mounting concerns
regarding such costs in light of efficiency.17 Rather than relying on other trial
safeguards, 1s embedded in F.R.C.P., the Court ultimately held that the source of the
problem was found in the existing interpretation of the pleading standard. In
Twombly, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Conley and "retired" its "no set of
facts" language and stipulated that one must plead "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face"; 19 thus, amending the standard of possibility to
plausibility. Iqbal not only reinforced Twombly, but maintained that Twombly 's
heightened standard applied uniformly to all civil actions, confirming the
transsubstantivity of "Twiqbal."21 Critics contemplate whether Twiqbal was indeed
a departure from the pleading standard or if it merely solidified the court's daily
practice. Nevertheless, without undertaking the proper steps set forth in the Rules
Enabling Act, a clear divergence continues to exist between the codified rule and
the current Twiqbal holding.
This Note aims to explore the legitimacy behind Twiqbal. Part I will briefly
look at the objectives of the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The purpose of establishing a uniform and transsubstantive approach
will be considered in light of democratic ideals and efficiency; examining the
separation of powers as well as its practical application. Congress allocated the rule
13. See Catherine T. Struve, Procedure as Pamlimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 421 (2010) (reviewing the
interlocking aspects of contemporary civil procedure in conjunction with the court's contemporaneous
pleading stance and the potential effects on substantive rights).
14. Miller, supra note 7, at 9 ("To some degree these shifts are a response ... from the business
community.") (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006)).
15. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
17. See FED. R. Clv. P. 1. See also Ronald J. Allen and Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of
Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1589732.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (heightened pleading
standard); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment).
19. 550 U.S. at 570, 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. In determining the requirements to satisfy F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2), the Conley Court decision provides a
two-part holding: (1) a statement must simply give the defendant "fair notice" of what the plaintiffs claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests; (2) a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove "no" set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief. This Note only pertains to the forner rather than the latter. See generally David L. Noll,
The Indeterminacy ofIqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 133-37 (2010) (explaining how Iqbal continued the standard of
plausibility expressed by the Twomblv Court).
21. The nickname "Twiqbal" has gained increasing popularity when collectively referring to the
heightened pleading requirements set forth by Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, New Pleading,
New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010)
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making power to the Supreme Court because Congress believed power should be
given be to those who are "better suited" to ensure the competence of the federal
courts.22 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were also constructed after the
Federal Rules of Equity, where principal drafters, Charles E. Clark and Edson R.
Sunderland, were influencing actors that advocated that judges should be given
appropriate discretion in determining what is fair and equitable.23 Although the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did hold neutrality and uniformity to be key, the
notion of subjectivity was not lost during the initial drafts.
Part II considers how public policy and litigation changed over the twentieth
century and continued into the twentieth first century. From Dioguardi v. Durning
and Conley v. Gibson to Twiqbal, this article will survey the differing court
rationales and how the Court exercised its political unaccountability to make
political decisions and to accommodate political changes. Part III will focus on the
legitimacy of the Twiqbal decisions from a procedural and policy perspective.
These decisions will be viewed in light of the Rules Enabling Act and the drafters'
intentions behind the Federal Rules. The role of judicial gate-keeping will also be
examined in determining whether judges should have the authority and to what
extent in certifying that frivolous and speculative lawsuits are not pursued,24 and
whether the Court can respond to political concern through adjudication.
Twiqbal's "plausibility" pleading standard is advantageous in various respects
and does respond to present day concerns, but such justifications do not render the
standard legitimate. Part IV questions why the Supreme Court decided to use these
rulings as a means to alter the meaning and application of Rule 8 rather than
amending the rule's language. Although Twiqbal differs from Conley, it does not
necessarily render it invalid. Twiqbal should be addressed in light of original
interpretation of Rule 8. The Rules Enabling Act does not provide a short-cut nor
does it freely permit the Supreme Court to make or amend rules in its judiciary
capacity; they must continue to follow the procedures set forth in the statute.
In conclusion, the source of the controversy does not lie with whether Twiqbal
was correctly decided, but whether the manner that it was decided was permissible.
Although judicial overreach is an established principle in American democracy, I
propose that an amendment be provided to the Rules Enabling Act to further
solidify this federalist objective and to prevent the Twiqbal controversy from
repeating itself.
22. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 896 (1999); see also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1731-32.
23. See Fairman, supra note 9 at 554 n.21, 557.
24. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil
Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
1107, 1109 (2010).
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Rules Enabling Act
The early 1930s marks the onset of judicial activism. The political sphere was
influenced heavily by Roosevelt's New Deal program and the economic
environment was driven by the capitalist needs of efficiency and debt repayment. 25
The 1934 Rules Enabling Act illustrates congressional consent and authorization
that the Supreme Court may promulgate rules of civil procedure for the federal
26district courts, as long as substantive rights are not altered. Shifting the authority
of rulemaking from Congress to the judicial branch illustrates congressional
recognition that prior legislative efforts, e.g., Code Pleading and the Conformity
Act, were futile. These actions convey that legislatures believe that procedural
rules should be in the hands of those who are procedurally involved on a day-to-day
basis, rather than those who are politically accountable and unfamiliar with judicial
realities. 27
Drafting Rule 8
Breaking Away from Traditional Pleading
The concept of pleadings may be attributed to the requirements set forth in
Medieval England. With emphasis on formality, pleadings were facilitated to
regulate the level and types of cases heard, acting as a mechanism to keep litigants
out of the courtroom.28 The "science of special pleading" became synonymous with
25. Congress imparted responsibility to the Supreme Court by realizing that it may be more appropriate
for the judicial branch to modernize the statutory framework for the procedural rulemaking process. See
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1678.
26. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, S. 3040, 73d Cong. (1934). The current version of the Rules Enabling
Act is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), which provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice
and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes
of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
27. Bone, supra note 22, at 888 & n.1 (1999); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 617 (2010) ("Those who designed and enacted the
1934 Rules Enabling Act did not suppose that a procedure equally suited to all kinds of cases could be
devised, but if special rules for a substantive category of cases were needed, their creation would be a task for
Congress.").
28. It was not until the sixteenth century, that pleadings became written and formalized; prior to that,
pleadings were informal and delivered orally to the court. Common law pleading functioned according to a
strict writ system. A plaintiff was obliged to obtain a writ from the court prior to filing a claim and in order for
the particular court to assert jurisdiction, the specificity established in the claim had to fit within a specific
from of action. In addition, writs were restricted exclusively to cases where precedents existed. If a writ was
2012] "Twiqbal": A Political Tool 205
the common law pleading because undue weight on the technicalities of the process
reduced the likelihood that such cases would be resolved on their merits.29
Generally, even before the ruling of the pleading stage, plaintiffs allegations were
mandated to reduction of a single issue, separating questions of fact from questions
of law. When complex and confusing cases arose, complaints could be readily
dismissed without existing precedents.
In the early nineteenth century, dissatisfaction with traditional common law
pleading induced the legal community to advocate for a new standard. The "code
pleading" reconciled the American ideals of justice and democracy with the
purpose of the pleading standard. 30 In 1848, the "Field Code" was developed 3 1 to
merge equitable and legal actions within the American Courts. It only required "[a]
statement of facts constituting the cause of action."32 Dominating court practice
until 1938, code pleading was a set of adopted rules that intended to promote clarity
and uniformity in pleading requirements, thereby preventing unfair surprise to
opponents and reducing costs of litigants. 33 The system was designed to require the
pleading of operative facts, rather than legal conclusions, so that courts may
effectively focus on the real issues of each case. 34 Nevertheless, similar to common
law pleading, code pleading proved to be equally confusing because it became
difficult to separate operative facts from legal facts and legal conclusions.
To curtail the reliance on the pleadings, the F.R.C.P. were intended to eliminate
the burdens under code pleading and provide an accepting 35 approach that was
acquired for the particular form of action, a plaintiff would then encounter procedures that were specific to the
cause of action. See, CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING & PROCEDURE 32 (1940) [hereinafter CLARK,
1940 CASEBOOK].
29. Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 976-78 (2008). See Julian, supra note 7, at 1184 (citing
CLARK, 1940 CASEBOOK, supra note 28, AT 34 ("Clark thought written pleadings forced the common law into
a 'prisonhouse' by eliminating the interaction between the litigants and the judge.... Two characteristics
exemplify the rigid formality of special pleading under the English Common law: the writ system and issue
pleading. The writ system required a plaintiff to bring his suit under a single correct form of action or have his
case dismissed. Plaintiffs often found this unmanageable because some writs overlapped, such as trespass and
trespass on the case. This overlap made it impossible at times to select the one correct writ for borderline
cases.")).
30. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 24, at 1111 ("[L]egal hurdles stood increasingly at odds with
Americans' expanding personal liberties and notions of equal justice, thereby fermenting an environment
conducive to a fundamental overhaul of the existing pleading system.").
31. See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 441, 448
(2009).
32. Id.; See also Julian, supra note 7, at 1186 (citing CLARK, 1940 CASEBOOK, supra note 28, at 137-38
("Because a plaintiff had only to state the facts on which he based his claim, in theory code pleading al- lowed
complaints so short and simple 'that even a child could write a letter to the court stating his case."')).
33. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 24, at 1114.
34. Id.; See also Julian, supra note 7, at 1187 (arguing that the flaws of code pleading deviated from
mandating that plaintiffs only state "'ultimate facts' unadulterated by legal conclusions or evidence . .. [a]
requirement [that] was 'logically indefensible' because no bright line exists between different types of
facts.").
35. Upon the construction of the 1938 Federal Rules, more than half of the states adopted the new rules
and willingly implemented them into their own state structure. See Dodson, supra note 31, at 450; see also
STEPHEN SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. Woo, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 54
(2010) ("In total, there are 26 out of 50 states whose procedure is closely modeled on the Federal Rules.").
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"simple, uniform, and transsubstantive . Rule 8 requires only "a short plain
statement of claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."38 The resulting
language illustrates a departure from a fact-focused pleading to a notice-focused
standard. 39 Moreover, Professor Dodson points out that the drafters did not include
the word "fact" in the rule's language nor did they mention it in their notes. 40
The Federal Rules were also to be applied to cases of law and equity, thereby
merging the two systems. Historically, equitable cases required judicial subjectivity
in determining fairness whereas cases of law were systematically more objective
and subject to categorical rules. Merging the two systems did not successfully
eliminate judicial discretion; in turn, the role of judicial subjectivity is an inherent,
contributing factor of the Federal Rules. For example, Rule 8 was intended to be
uniformly applied, however, notice varied, dependent on the claim and the
circumstances of each particular case.41 Judges were afforded discretion in
determining the appropriate level of notice and consequently, Rule 8 fostered
judiciary subjectivity even at the pleading stage. Nonetheless, the focus of the
drafters remained on simplifying the pleading requirement and establishing a lower
barrier so that both costs and expediency would be more effective.42 In 1937, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were presented to Congress and became law as a
result of congressional inaction.
Amending the Federal Rules
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
36. Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the "One
Size Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010) ("[T]ranssubstantive ... [is] the notion that
the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits: (1) regardless of the substantive law
underlying the claims, or 'case-type' transsubstantivity; and (2) regardless of the size of the litigation or the
stakes in- volved, or 'case-size' transsubstantivity.").
37. Fairman, supra note 9, at 556 (explaining that Charles E. Clark, a leading drafter of the Federal
Rules, liberally advocated a de-emphasis on pleadings, placing more significance on discovery and summary
judgment to distinguish the cases with merit from those without; and emphasizing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)
must be construed so as to do justice). Clark also embraced the idea of simple pleading requirements primarily
because the failure of code pleading stemmed from the approach's contradicting objectives: (a) "taking over
the equity principles of convenience and flexibility" and (b) "laying down rigid rules that would leave nothing
to discretion." Julian, supra note 7, at 1187.
38. FED. R. Clv. P. 8(a)(2).
39. Dodson, supra note 31, at 449.
40. Id; 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1202 (3d ed.
1990) (discussing that absent from Federal Rule 8(a)(2) is the constraint found in the code pleading where a
pleader must establishfacts to constitute a cause ofaction).
41. See Dodson, supra note 31 at 449; see also, id. ("The notice in mind is rather that of the general
nature of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other
acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated-but not of details which he
should ascertain for himself in preparing his defense-and to tell the court of the broad outlines of the case."
(quoting Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460-61 (1943)).
42. Drafters believed that the efficiency of the simplified pleading would in part be attributed to the role
of the discovery process; discovery rather than the pleadings would have the function to screen less
meritorious cases, so that it would be more likely that such cases be resolved on their merits rather than
technicalities. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007); see also Schwartz and Appel,
supra note 24, at 1118.
[Vol. 37:2206
"Twiqbal": A Political Tool
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and subsequently approved by the
United States Congress. The Court's modifications to the rules are usually based
upon recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
federal judiciary's internal policy-making body.4 3 In 1958, Congress divested the
responsibility for the rule-making function from the Supreme Court and allocated it
to the Judicial Conference of the United States.44 Subsequently, the Judicial
Conference created the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure as
well as Advisory Committees to propose and modify the rules.45 Committees are
made up of judges from the federal circuit and district courts, attorneys from the
Department of Justice, and law professors from reputable institutions.46 Advisory
Committees are responsible for drafting the appropriate amendments accompanied
with explicatory committee notes in light of the committee's agenda.47 Although
the advisory committees draft the amendments, outside actors are instrumental to
the committees' end product. 48
The inclusion of the amendment process suggests that there is a more
appropriate alternative from changing the rules through judicial reinterpretation. It
acts as a limitation on the courts and indicates that the judiciary ought not to abuse
the power of procedural rulemaking via adjudication. The authority to freely
reinterpret the rules as the Court sees fit will result in potential enlargement or
abridgement of substantive rights; a consequence that was not part of the initiative
of the Federal Rules. 49  The amendment process ensures that transparency and
predictability will be maintained.
II. POLICY CONCERNS FROM CONLEY TO TWIQBAL
Almost two decades following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
43. Burbank, supra note 2 (discussing that the history of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act reflects a primary
concern regarding the allocation of power to make law between the legislative and judicial branches).
44. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331
(2006).
45. Title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (1988), Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2701(b)-(f), 2072-75 (2006), amended as supra note 40. Advisory committees exist
for the following areas of law: civil, criminal, bankruptcy, appellate and admiralty.
46. Id. at § 2073(a)(2).
47. UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEDURES, http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/JudicialConfProcedures.aspx (last visited October
20, 2011).
48. Empirical data and panel discussions are common mechanisms that advisory committees have
utilized in order to gauge support from the legal and academic communities. For example, at the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee following the Twombly decision, a panel discussion was held in order to determine the
appropriate time for the committee to respond and reevaluate the pleading standards in light of the Supreme
Court decision. See Memorandum from the Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. On Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Dec. 8, 2009) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/niles/
Reports/CVl2-2008.pdf.
49. Moore, supra note 12, at 1040 (discussing that "[t]he Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules
does not involve the same separation of powers issues inherent in cases involving normal statutory




Procedure, the Supreme Court recognized that a liberal pleading standard was
essential to the emerging civil rights movement. In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Conley v. Gibson, a class action suit brought by African-American railroad
employees against their union. 5 0 The employees alleged in the complaint that the
union failed to protect them from demotion and discharge on the same basis as
white employees. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Black wrote that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."51  Although the Court focused the decision on the appropriate role of
pleading standards, the Court expanded the interpretation of Rule 8 in part to
encourage that courts be used as an accessible forum to segregated America. To
further maintain the balance between meritorious and meritless claims, the low
threshold permitted African Americans and other minorities to use the judicial
system to achieve justice. 52
Within the context of civil rights, "the liberal pleading standard is a critical
prerequisite to ensure that victims of discrimination can take full advantage of
federal statutory safeguards." 53 The key successes of civil rights litigation in the
last half century were attributed, in part, to the liberal pleading standard set forth in
the Federal Rules and reinforced by Conley.54 Conley's notice pleading was not
temporarily upheld but was consistently affirmed as the Supreme Court "rebuffed
efforts by district and appellate courts to heighten pleading standards, and no
Justice ever 'express[ed] any doubt' about the 'adequacy' of Conley's interpretation
of Rule 8."55
Legal scholars consider Conley to be an affirmation of the rationale employed
by Rule 8; an objective to eliminate procedural hurdles at the initial stages of
litigation that could ultimately be fatal to cases that do in fact have merit. 56
Although Conley may be warranted from a policy standpoint, it is not clear whether
the Supreme Court had authority to broaden the scope of an existing written rule to
indirectly accommodate racial tension. The Court's decision confirmed that "[i]t
was important to give civil rights complainants ... their day in court and let their
cases be decided on the merits."57
50. Conley, 355 U.S. at41..
51. Id. at 45-6.
52. Schwartz and Appel, supra note 24, at 1120 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets
Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998)).
53. Civin & Adegbile, supra note 11, at 3. .
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The
following Supreme Court cases rejected invoking a heightened pleading standard: Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
NA., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
56. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.").
57. Suzette M. Malveaux, Salvaging Civil Rights Claims: How Plausibility Discovery Can Help Restore
Federal Court Access After Twombly and Iqbal, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Nov. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Malveaux%20issue%20brief%20-
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Civil rights and employment discrimination claims continued to play an active
role in the federal courts post-civil rights movement. From 1988 to 2003, the
number of employment discrimination cases within the federal system increased in
absolute numbers in proportion to civil litigation as a whole.5 8 Conley's standard
made it fairly simple for plaintiffs to successfully plead discriminatory intent,
especially for parties who did not have access to evidence.5 9 The rise in civil rights
and employment relief may be attributed to legislative developments.60
Undoubtedly, access to courts is a fundamental issue for private and public
parties. It contributes to the judicial foundation of stare decisis, where precedents
are established and encouraged to be followed within a transsubstantive
framework.61 Nevertheless, one must be granted not merely access but fair access
to courts. The rise of cases62 at the federal district level triggered political concern
to alleviate the courts' caseload.
Since Conley, pretrial litigation has become the focal point of concern
regarding judicial economy. The court is increasingly utilized as a "battleground for
titans of industry to dispute complex claims involving enormous stakes ... and the
situs for aggregate litigation on behalf of large numbers of people and entities."63
Complex claims involving technology, science, and business engaged in interstate
and international commerce are more familiar today than fifty years ago, primarily
because of the advent of technology. Complicated legal issues require more time
and effort, which is burdensome for the parties and the courts,64 and potentially
advantageous for attorneys.65 Rising litigation costs66 play a key role in that they
%20Fed%2OAccess%20after/o2OTwombly.pdf.
58. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV 517, 524 (2010).
59. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 24.
60. See Civin & Adegbile, supra note 11. See also Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryan
Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United
States 13 (Am. Bar Found. Research Paper Series No. 08-04, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract =1093313 (suggesting that with the recognition of sexual harassment suits as a
violation of Title VII in 1986, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the American Disabilities Act of 1992, legal
action became a more appropriate and popular forum for social discrimination).
61. Miller, supra note 7, at 72.
62. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE
L.J. 597, 601 & n.5 (2010) ("The number of civil cases pending in district courts in 1965 was 74,395.
WARREN ONLEY III, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1965, at 88 (1965). The
comparable number in 1985 was 254,114. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 276 (1985).").
63. Miller, supra note 7, at 7-8.
64. See id. at 8-9 (arguing that the trend of complex legal issues helps to explain the importance of the
pretrial process, where judicial case management and alternative dispute resolutions have become key efforts
to avoid trial); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Years Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1255 (2005) (finding that an abundance of data shows that the number of trials is declining).
65. Carrington, supra note 62, at 610 ("[B]usiness litigators' practice of billing for their services for the
hour ... billing heavily for their time.").
66. Although political concerns existed regarding the need to ensure judiciary efficiency and to
minimize any potential overload, arguments for excessive use of discovery and associated costs are not
proven to be a reality. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., National, Case-Basd
Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 12-13
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are attributed to the need for expert testimony67 and to provide access to evidence
that is not ordinarily and readily available. 68
Although the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emphasized that
the rules be applied uniformly, that objective has not been consistently carried out.
Inconsistency may be ascribed to the need to further effectuate the balance between
judicial accessibility and efficiency in light of surrounding circumstances. For
instance, since Conley, the legislature has enacted several acts that heighten the
pleading requirements, e.g. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PLRSA") 69
and the Y2K Act. 70 The aforementioned congressional acts illustrate that, although
a transsubstantive framework exists or intends to exist, substantive rights must be
altered to accommodate current concerns and realities through procedural
rulemaking. 71
Post-Conley, lower courts have attempted to impose heightened pleading in a
variety of contexts, irrespective of the unambiguous language set forth in Rule 8.72
Congressional enactments and lower court holdings illustrate the unwillingness to
afford an unfettered right to court73 and an effort to eliminate unmeritorious
litigation. 74
(2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf (finding that
with the exception of a few cases, the cost of discovery and related pretrial proceedings is small when
compared to the stakes in the cases, ranging from 1.6 % to 3.3 % of the amounts in dispute).
67. Carrington, supra note 62, at 610.
68. Id. at 610-11 (noting that the abusive, excessive use and costs of discovery were affiliated with
commercial suits rather than civil rights claims).
69. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) [hereinafter
PSLRA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). PSLRA is an effort by Congress, over a
presidential veto, to curb abusive and frivolous private securities litigation by enacting a provision that
requires plaintiffs to state with particularity facts that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the requisite state of mind. See also R. Tyler Hand, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Heightened Pleading Standards in Class Action Litigation, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 685 (2003).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§6601-6617 (2001); Fairman, supra note 9, at 614-615 (explaining that heightened
pleading was a result of congressional and senate hearings present in the bill's legislative history and an effort
by Congress to limit meritless, frivolous litigation).
71. Carrington, supra note 27, at 610.
72. Scott Dodson, Pondering Iqbal: Federal Pleading and Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 43, 47 (2010); Fairman, supra note 9 at 551. See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998);
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
73. Mollie Brunworth, Proposed Change to Civil Lawsuit Pleading Standard Strays Far From Original
Federal Rule, 25 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1, 2-3 (2010), available at http://www.wlf.org/
publishing/publication detail.asp?id=2212.
74. Educadores Puertorriquefios en Acci6n, v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that trial
judges have wide discretion in the management of the fact-finding process which is more useful and equitable
to all parties and that heightened pleading standards, except those that emanate from either congressional or
Rule-based authority, are impermissible).
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III. TWIQBAL: A CONLEY REPEAT
Re-defining Rule 8
In 2007, the Supreme Court arguably contradicted Conley 's ruling for the first
time. Twombly promulgated a new, stricter "plausibility" standard, ruling that
plaintiffs in an antitrust case may survive a motion to dismiss only if one pleads
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 75 Unlike
Conley, Twombly did not involve racial tensions; it was a consumer class action
brought against local telephone carriers for conspiring to inflate charges and to
inhibit market entry of rival firms in violation of federal antitrust law. The plaintiff
consumers contended that the defendants "engaged in parallel conduct" in their
business activity to thwart the growth of competition. The plaintiffs premised their
allegations on a "compelling common motivation" to inhibit competitive efforts of
other regional telephone and Internet providers. 76 The complaint set forth that the
local carriers "ma[de] unfair agreements . . . for access to . . . networks,
overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage [other local service
providers'] relations with their own customers."77 The Court did not find that the
complaint evidenced any specific agreements among the defendant service
providers, but that it merely set forth that such agreements could be inferred from
the defendants' inactive efforts to pursue appealing business opportunities where it
could be deduced that they did possess "substantial competitive advantages."78
Driving its decision, the Supreme Court believed that the public policy
underlying traditional notice pleading no longer provided the appropriate balance
necessary to promote justice and curb frivolous or highly speculative language.79 It
remained unclear whether Twombly applied exclusively to costly litigation, antitrust
conspiracy suits or whether uniformly across the board.80
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified Twombly and
held that the heightened pleading requirement8 1 applied to all federal civil litigation
82
claims, further deviating from the Conley framework. Unlike Twombly, Iqbal
declined to cite Conley, a well-established precedent that has been cited by courts
45,090 times. 83 Iqbal was a civil rights lawsuit brought by a Muslim male charged
with identity theft in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. He
75. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547.
76. Id. at 551.
77. Id. at 550.
78. Id. at 551.
79. Id. at 558-59.
80. See Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1083-85 (2009) (inferring
that Twombly pertained only to high-discovery-cost cases).
8 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
82. Wendy Couture, Conley v. Gibson's "No Set of Facts" Test: Neither Cancer Nor Cure, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 19, 25 (2010), available at http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/articles/penn-
statim/conley-v-gibsonE2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cno-set-of-facts%E2%80%9D-test-neither-cancer-nor-
cure!..
83. Id. at 30.
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alleged that he was detained and identified as a person of special interest based
solely on his race and national origin. On a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that
the plaintiffs allegations of discrimination were inadequate to survive a 12(b)(6)
.- 84
motion to dismiss.
In re-evaluating Twombly, the Iqbal Court re-emphasized that Rule 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, however, conclusory and formulaic allegations
will not suffice. In its reevaluation, the Court found that Twombly rested on two
fundamental principles: (1) that a court must accept all plaintiffs allegations as true
is inapplicable to legal conclusions; and (2) a complaint must state a plausible claim
for relief to survive a motion to dismiss.85  In its interpretation of Rule 8, the
Supreme Court justified its holding in affirming that Twombly "expounded the
pleading standard for all civil actions."86
Although some scholars87 believe that Twiqbal did not unilaterally alter the
pleading requirements, the Courts' holdings deviate from the decision written in
Conley. As previously stated, there was a shift from the notice pleading to the
plausibility pleading, however, it is unclear if that was the case in practice.
Arguably, the Supreme Court merely confirmed in writing the "actual" pleading
requirements as employed by the federal district courts.
As a means to case management, lower courts did heighten pleading
requirements, yet, the overwhelming number of Conley affirmations show that
Conley was more supported than not. Subsequent congressional hearings, proposed
legislation, and academic works further illustrate the unsettling effects of Twiqbal
and the small probability that preserving status quo would minimize the political
concerns.
While the holding in Twiqbal certainly deviates from the Supreme Court
precedent written in Conley, there are both advantageous and disadvantageous
justifications for the change. The critical issue is whether the Supreme Court was
warranted to reinterpret Rule 8 through adjudication, a decision that would not only
overturn a past precedent, but a decision that potentially affects substantive rights.
Distinguishing Conley From Twiqbal
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 states that the judiciary has the capacity to
construct and amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as shown by the passing
of the rules in 1938. The Act does not explicitly permit the Supreme Court to
84. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ashcroft v..Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 07-1015),
2008 WL 336225, available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/7pet/2007-1015.pet.aa.html,cert
granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 554 U.S. 902 (2008).
85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
86. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (internal citation omitted).
87. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Meserole St. Recycling, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969 (W.D. Mich.
2008) ("Twombly did not change did not change the notice-pleading standard; 'detailed factual allegations'
are still not necessary, but the Supreme Court did hold that a plaintiff's complaint must contain 'more than
labels and conclusions."'); see also Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117 (2007).
88. Couture, supra note 82.
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rewrite the rules or their interpretation through court decisions. Undoubtedly, the
Supreme Court was granted the capacity of procedural rulemaking through the
appropriate process. Amending the rules is also an available avenue within the
Act's provision, potentially as a means to discourage ad hoc and unregulated
adjudicative reinterpretation. With ways to amend the meaning and application of
the rules, one must ask whether reinterpreting unambiguous language is a legitimate
means to breathe life into Rule 8 as a way to effectuate case management.
Although Twiqbal is certainly a divergence from Conley in terms of
interpretation, does it truly differ from the manner that Conley was decided? Is it
possible that they both provide illustrations on how the Court used Rule 8 to
respond and conform to existing political concerns? In the midst of segregation and
the onset of the civil rights movement, Conley was an effort by the court to ensure
that African Americans use the court as a forum for discriminatory claims. The
legislative and executive branches made no explicit efforts to ensure that minorities
would be afforded their day in court, however, the Court used the adjudication
process to achieve immediate relief.89  Similarly, Twiqbal was also a response to
the political reality that courts may be overly burdened with meritless cases
resulting in needless and expensive discovery. Since Conley, Congress has become
increasingly comfortable in enacting legislation to heighten pleading requirements
for specific areas of law to avert frivolous suits, e.g., the Y2K Act. 90
Twiqbal also confers more discretion 91 to federal district judges. The Iqbal
Court stated that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim will be
"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense."92 The Court approvingly invites personal
subjectivity when deciding the merits of the case at the pleading stage. Post-
Twiqbal, there have been no direct judicial decisions that state that a claim that may
be dismissed as implausible would (or might) have survived under the Conley "no
set of facts" standard. 93
To understand the significance of Twiqbal, one must question the role of judges
and what their role ought to be in determining the adequacy of pleadings. Twiqbal
implicitly advocates that judges act as the gatekeepers to the courts. Although they
89. Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won't Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in
U.S. Labor Unions, 1935-85, 97 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 483, 484 (2003), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/311762 ("In arguing that courts were chief activists in promoting civil rights
during this period, at least in part because legislators frequently invited and even "commanded" them to
intervene, my account is consistent with judicial scholars who emphasize the links between elected official
behavior and court power.").
90. See, e.g., Y2K Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2006).
91. Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 157, 159 (2010) ("Iqbal is about increased judicial discretion to inquire into and parse the
details of complaints, almost certainly producing more 12(b)(6) dismissals, as well as wide variance from case
to case, even within the same court.").
92. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
93. Franklin E. White, Jr., The Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly Pleading standard: Has its Application
been Outcome Determinative in Court to International Trade Cases, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.




should play some part in this function, should a claim's merits be based exclusively
on a judge's experience? Rather than informing the opposing party of the legal
claims, Twiqbal shifts the sufficiency of adequacy to judicial discretion. Although
not warranted, presiding judges invoke personal stances on key political issues and
there are few constraints, if any, in applying the plausibility standard. 94
Although federal judges are not traditionally permitted to decide which set of
facts are more likely to be accurate at the pleading stage,95 the Iqbal Court justified
granting the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by weighing the "plausibility of different
scenarios" in finding "that the government's explanations as to what occurred were
more likely than Iqbal's allegations."96 This standard gives more discretion to
judges than summary judgments, where the judge must construe all the allegations
as true and base his decision on the "reasonable juror," rather than invoking his own
opinion. In weighing the evidence, judges are not only encouraged to evaluate the
sufficiency and accuracy of the facts alleged, but they must also consider whether
the claims and stakes in question warrant a proportional cost of discovery. 97
Although meritless litigation is certainly a concern, unlike the circumstances of
Conley, immediacy of reinterpreting Rule 8 is not equally justifiable. Conley helped
to ensure that minorities were afforded civil rights whereas Twiqbal aims to further
judicial economy. Moreover, the former directly targeted constitutionally protected
rights whereas the latter was a means to further case management. Although Conley
may have been an opportune time to further minimize the barriers that pleading
requirements establish, Twiqbal does not necessitate the expansion of judicial
safeguarding especially when other avenues are available. Commentators propose
that Conley is further warranted because it remains in the spirit of the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure, whose objective was to minimize the procedural
hurdles for litigants. 98
Historically, the Rules Enabling Act reasoned that the Court could be an
appropriate key player in employing procedural rules because it was less likely that
94. Roger M. Michalski, Assessing lqbal, Harvard Law and Policy Review Online (Dec. 8, 2010),
available at http://hlpronline.com/2010/12/assessing-iqbal/.
95. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 583 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("When a federal
court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or
admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of
the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.")).
96. Michalski, supra note 94 (emphasis added) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1951).
97. Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of
Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 896 (2009) ("[P]roportionality rules ask the
impossible judges must decide when discovery cost is proportional to somemeasureof 'value' that includes
both evidence value . .. and case value .... This yields a fundamental information-timing problem: discovery
disputes occur before parties marshal all the evidence, so how can courts measure the value of particular
evidence, much less case merits?").
98. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 61, 64 (2007) ("Conley has long been treated as an
authoritative statement of the law that has been followed uniformly in the Supreme Court and elsewhere and
the plaintiffs' allegations are quite in the spirit of the Federal Rules. The Conley complaint is fact-free but
gives notice of the basic elements of the claim. Twombly can not be defended if the only question is whether
it captures the sense of notice pleading in earlier cases.").
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the Court could be swayed by public opinion in determining what is best for
litigants and the court. The Court did not receive this authority to expand its power,
nor is it constitutionally 99 consistent. 100 By inviting judiciary subjectivity, the
fairness of the federal justice system is compromised by permitting judges to
ultimately decide a suit's success at the pleading stage.
In comparing Conley against Twiqbal and questioning the immediacy of relief
in each case, the shift to the plausibility pleading standard suggests an increase of
authority to the judiciary, an increase that is not warranted, directly or indirectly.
IV. THE TWIQBAL FIX
Responding or Repairing?
Replacing the notice pleading, a standard in effect for nearly five decades, begs
the question: Why? Commentators have criticized and praised the Twiqbal
plausibility pleading with endless lists of both the advantages and disadvantages of
the decision as well as its effects. Nevertheless, because of its speculative nature,
few reviews exist to the rationale driving the court in its recent decisions.
As previously held, the notice and plausibility pleadings were effectuated in the
same manner through the adjudication process. Rather than relying solely on the
text of Rule 8, the Supreme Court used judicial interpretation to further articulate
the meaning and application of the rule. As Conley aimed to further liberalize the
requirements, Twiqbal restricted the liberal pleadings by enforcing plausibility
rather than possibility. Twiqbal has been theorized as merely an effort to undo
Conley; if Conley did not correctly interpret the application of Rule 8, how can the
Supreme Court be sure that Twiqbal is correct. If the judiciary did not interpret it
correctly the first time around, will it be able to interpret it correctly the second time
around?
On another note, Twiqbal was not merely a means to repair Conley but,
arguably a response to current political concerns. It is not necessarily the case that
Conley was misinterpreted but that the Supreme Court realized that the notice
pleading was no longer effective. In establishing procedural rules, the judiciary is
accredited with knowing best;101 however, knowing best does not authorize the
judiciary to unilaterally tweak the rules by circumventing the amendment process.
Although judicial misinterpretation and policy concerns both warrant a
response, it is not clear that they both evenly warrant legitimate, judicial relief. It is
contended that the former rather than the latter merits judicial relief, but it becomes
problematic when the notion of misinterpretation is driven by existing concerns.
Furthermore, it may be more advantageous to distinguish between Twombly
and Iqbal to further understand the objective that Twiqbal, as a whole, aims to
achieve. Twombly, is an antitrust case concerning conspiracy allegations through
99. U.S. CONST. art. III.
100. See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1688.
101. See id. at 1731.
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parallel conduct, a violation of the Sherman Act. Given the inherent, speculative
nature of conspiracies, plaintiffs often lack accessibility to internal documentation
that substantiate an antitrust claim.102 Thus, discovery becomes key. The
heightened standard assures that discovery cannot be used as an abusive tool.
Moreover, the requirement of factual specificity applies to a broad range of
conspiracy claims.103
Iqbal highlights the same point in civil rights. Overruling the lower courts, the
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision expanded Twombly and dismissed the allegations
without permitting Iqbal to acquire discovery and without ruling on the merits of
his claim. Accordingly, government is potentially afforded greater leeway in
carrying out courses of action that appear discriminatory.
Iqbal did not evaluate nor distinguish the effects that a heightened pleading
standard may have on a civil rights claim versus anti-trust claims. Twombly and
Iqbal present a commonality in that "Iqbal did not have an opportunity to observe
the defendants' state of mind, just as the plaintiffs in Twombly did not have an
opportunity to observe the state of mind and secret conduct of the alleged antitrust
violators.",104 In applying Twombly, Iqbal illustrates that distinctions ought not to
be considered in order to effectuate the framers' transsubstantive approach, despite
the drafters' efforts in recognizing exceptionsios to Rule 8. Although pushing for a
transsubstantive approach is consistent with the drafters' efforts, substantive rights
differ dependent on the claim presented and the parties at stake. 106
It may appear to be a procedural rule, though substituting the notice pleading
with a higher standard inevitably alters litigants' substantive rights.io7 A complaint
carries significant weight because judges use it at the outset to causally determine
the success of each case before further continuing with the court process.
Substantive rights are affected because the higher pleading requirement places a
heavier burden on the plaintiff to establish accurate and sufficient allegations to
survive a motion to dismiss. Undoubtedly, the Court has the capacity to construct,
define, and re-define the Federal Rules, however, they ought not to design or
interpret the rules in such a way as to alter an individual's substantive rights. 08
The Legislative Fix
It is undisputed that Twiqbal's plausibility pleading has replaced Conley's
holding, however, is Twiqbal actually achieving the objectives that the Court set
forth? The Twombly Court explained that the plausibility pleading was a key
102. See Michalski, supra note 94.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss); FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (heightened pleading
standard); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment).
107. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard.").
108. See Carrington, supra note 27, at 661.
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response to abusive litigation costs. 109 However, Professor Scott Dodson theorizes
that the recent standard actually increases costs and prolongs efforts. 110  The
unnecessary costs may be reduced at the discovery stage. Increasing costs exist at
the pleading stage by shifting costs to an earlier pre-trial stage. By placing more
emphasis on the accuracy and sufficiency of the complaint, Twiqbal actually
compels plaintiffs to expend more time and resources in making sure that the
complaint meets the heightened standard. In turn, defendants expend more time
and resources on answering the complaint, providing affirmative defenses and filing
motions to dismiss, pursuant to 12(b)(6) rather than focusing on the merits of the
case.111
The burden of unwarranted merits discovery may have lessened, however, its
diminishment is at the cost of dismissing cases that are possibly meritorious.
Studies show that the heightening pleading standard. inevitably dismissed more
cases in comparison to the prior notice pleading.112 Nonetheless, the heightened
standard does not distinguish meritorious suits from malicious suits; thus,
meritorious claims will nonetheless be dismissed.
Judges have a duty to interpret and govern the procedural rules in a 'just,
speedy, and inexpensive" manner; 1 1 3 Twiqbal fails to equally consider the fairness
prong. The Supreme Court holdings prioritize the speculative effectiveness of
timing and defendant costs over what are in fact reasonable and just, inherent and
necessary characteristics of the judicial process.114 Perhaps, the legislature should
be responsible for limiting Twiqbal to ensure that justice remains a crucial aspect of
the judicial and court processes.
109. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[Ilt is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level
suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with
no 'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support a § 1
claim." (quoting Dura Pharms Inc v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
110. Twombly, Iqbal and Federal Pleadings Standards: Sea Change or Same Old, Same Old?, Webinar
presented By the IADC Appellate Practice, Business Litigation, Corporate Counsel, and Class Action and
Multi-Party Litigation Committees (Nov. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.iadclaw.org/UserFiles/file/Twiqbal%201 _1 11 0%20final%20presentation.pdf
111. Id.; see Miller, supra note 7, at 69 ("The savings achieved by early termination may not offset the
increased costs likely to be incurred as a result of more extensive preinstitution activities and fact-based
pleading, the increased number of dismissal and summary judgment motions, and, potentially, the increased
number of appeals from judgments following early terminations.").
112. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao ofPleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U.
L. REV. 553, 556 (2010). Professor Hatamyar selected 1200 cases at random: 500 cases were chosen two years
prior to Twombly, 500 from the two years following Twombly, and 200 from the four month period following
Iqbal. Her findings show that the 12(b)(6) dismissal rate did not change significantly for the initial pre- and
post-Twombly periods, but there is a marked difference in the data following 1qbal where the dismissal rate
increased.
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
114. Stephen N. Surbin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 933-74 (1987)
(discussing the documentation of the history and motivation regarding the adoption of the federal rules; in
merging the systems of law and equity and determining what is reasonable and fair remained an important
aspect of the court forum, the significance of employing figures that were not politically accountable further
demonstrates the necessity to uphold justice within.); see also Fed. Equity Rule 25 (requiring "a short and
simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of
evidence"), reprinted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574.
115. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., DRAFT ARTICLE ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (1981) ("[J]udicial
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Although legislative bills have been introduced to the respective houses, they
fail to adequately respond to the issues that Twiqbal presents and the policy
concerns that prompted the heightened pleading standard; perhaps, a reason why
they never became law.
Senator Arlen Specter proposed the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 to
the Senate in July 22, 2009 and introduced it twice to the Committee on the
Judiciary, however, there was no subsequent action. The bill provides that:
[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or
by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
takes effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court
shall not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957).116
The proposed legislation aims to ensure that federal courts follow the
traditional approach to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As previously stated,
it is unclear whether Conley's interpretation of Rule 8 is synonymous with the
drafters' interpretation. Conley was decided in the same manner as Twiqbal, as a
judicial response to existing political concern. Rather than relying on the literal text
of Rule 8, the Court unilaterally invoked its own interpretation of an established
rule. Restoring Conley would not only disregard the inefficiencies affecting
modern judicial economy, but it would also bring about confusion between the
judicial and legislative roles. Although Twiqbal begets a "blank check for federal
judges to get rid of cases they disfavor,"ll7 overruling court precedent with
legislation would be synonymous with fighting fire with fire1 18 by encouraging
branches to work against one another rather than with one another.
Similarly, Representative Jerrold Nadler proposed the Open Access to Courts
Act of 2009 to the House of Representatives, providing that: A court shall not
dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.119
This bill has not yet become law and it is unlikely that it will rouse sufficient
support to do so in the future, even though it had thirty-six co-sponsors supporting
the bill, more than the two co-sponsors supporting the correlating senate bill.
policymaking is [an] inevitably inadequate or imperfect policymaking. The fact-finding resources of courts
are limited - and inordinately dependent upon the facts presented to the courts by the interested parties before
them. Legislatures, on the other hand, have extensive fact-finding capabilities that can reach far beyond the
narrow special interests urged by parties in a lawsuit.").
116. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 S. 1504, Cong. Ill § 2 (2009).
117. Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shif on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/2Ibar.html?_r-3&hpw.
118. Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and lqbal: Where Do We Go From Here?, 95 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 24, 29 (2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1567694 ("An attempt to overrule a judicial
decision that adopts a different view of what the question is runs the risk of the Court and Congress speaking
past each other, with the result that the statute misfires.").
119. H.R. 4115, Il1lth Cong. § 2 (2009).
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Although bills that do not become law may be reintroduced, it is unlikely that
these proposed legislative acts are going to attract sufficient support from the
respective houses. The bills do nothing but overturn the newly established
plausibility pleading, a rational standard that acts as a mechanism to prevent
abusive and frivolous litigation. I also deem that the new pleading requirements are
not flawless. In order to achieve a pleading standard that is reliable and not easily
susceptible to judicial transformation, the legislature should elaborate on the
Court's interpretation. 120 Congressional action not only requires further empirical
studies and research, but action that further defines and limits the Twiqbal pleading
requirements.
Contrastingly, some political scholars and commentators support Twombly and
Iqbal by advocating that the decisions "faithfully interpret and apply the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [which] are consistent with
the vast bulk of prior precedent, and strike an appropriate balance between the
legitimate interests of plaintiffs and defendants.',121 After evaluating legislative
efforts as well as other proposals, Professor Hartnett proposes an amendment to
Rule 12 that helps protect plaintiffs from having their claims dismissed when the
requisite evidence is in the hands of the defendant. 122
Essentially, Professor Hartnett proposes a rule that allows courts to determine
whether to grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the parties' argument over
whether sufficient evidence exists to support a claim or, in the absence of that,
whether discovery is likely to produce evidence sufficient to support a claim.123
Under this proposal, one that does not advocate for the reinstatement of Conley, if
the court refuses to permit discovery, the allegation is not necessarily dismissed.124
120. Hartnett, supra note 118, at 25-26 (pointing out that restoring Conley's "no set of facts" language
would still require the Court to supply some interpretation, an interpretation that may nonetheless restore
Twiqbal, regardless of legislative efforts).
121. Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. lqbal: Access to Justice Denied, Hearing before the H
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 1Ith Cong.
(2009) [hereinafter House Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear 0910271 .html.
122. Hartnett, supra note 118, at 33.
123. Id. Professor Hartnett suggests the following:
Rule 12(j): Allegations Likely To Have Evidentiary Support After a Reasonable
Opportunity for Discovery
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) that has not been deferred until trial, the claim
sought to be dismissed includes an allegation specifically identified as provided in Rule
1 l(b)(3) as likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery,
the court must either (1) assume the truth of the allegation, or (2) decide whether the
allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery. In deciding whether an allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must consider the parties' access to
evidence in the absence of discovery and state on the record the reason for its decision.
If the court decides that the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for discovery, it must allow for that discovery, under the standards
of Rule 26, and deny the motion to dismiss. If the court decides that the allegation is not
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court
must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, and provide all parties




Plaintiffs are, however, afforded the opportunity to present the evidence in their
possession to persuade the court that a triable issue does, in fact, exist. Moreover,
Professor Hartnett also minimizes the emphasis that Rule 8 plays post-Twiqbal and
attempts to restore the emphasis and function of other judicial safeguards, e.g.,
summary judgment.125
In brief, I agree with Professor Hartnett that the reinstatement of Conley will
not restore the legitimacy of the pleading requirements nor will it appease existing
political concern.126 However, I do not believe that providing judges with the
discretion to decide whether an allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for discovery will effectuate the inefficiencies that
Twiqbal creates. Professor Hartnett's proposal calls for judges and plaintiffs to
participate in a guessing game. Plaintiffs will speculate as to what and where they
are looking and courts will conjecture as to whether or not there is an opportunity
for evidentiary access,127 something that cannot be sufficiently achieved in judicial
capacity.128 Rather than limiting judicial subjectivity, which is increased because of
Twiqbal, the appropriate response would be to limit or guide judicial subjectivity
rather than further develop it.
Perhaps the more responsive approach would be for Congress to further define
and limit Twiqbal so that both the legislative and judicial branches may support a
pleading standard. A clarification of the new pleading requirements would also
ensure that federal courts understand and apply the plausibility standard in a correct
manner and not exploit it through unfettered judicial subjectivity. Limiting Twiqbal
would also prevent the court from using a federal rule to enlarge judicial power or
to freely respond to political concerns.129
In order for this to be accomplished, the legislature must continue to hold
congressional hearings and gather empirical data so that it can fully understand the
125. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15, 18 (2010) ("The motion to dismiss is the new summary judgment
motion.").
126. See "Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Court? ": Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 22 (2009) (Prepared Statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor
for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (arguing for an emergency-stopgap measure to
temporarily reset the law to its state prior to Twombly, rather than seeking a permanent restoration of Conley).
127. Liptak, supra note 117. Similarly to Iqbal, where the court held that judges ought to use their own
judicial experience and common sense, it will be nearly impossible to provide a systematic approach that
guides judges in determining the potentiality for discovery; likewise such ad hoc approaches only "license[]
highly subjective [and potentially flawed] judgments."
128. Hartnett, supra note 118, at 36. Though I do entirely support Professor Hartnett's objective of
transparency, where courts are encouraged to state on the record the reason for their decisions, statements
ought to be collected by the Federal Judicial Center and evaluated for recurring patterns, thus providing a
basis for rulemaking or legislation that codified a dominant approach to a recurring pattern, or adopted one of
the competing approaches to a recurring pattem. It could also provide a basis for rejecting the way courts
handle a recurring pattern.
129. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) ("Courts are the mere instruments of
the law, and can will nothing."); Edward McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial
Policy-Making, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837, 843 (1955) (explaining that judicial self-restraint is predicated on
reason and confidence that the legislature, a politically accountable body, has the capacity and authority to
enact policy decisions; therefore the judiciary must defer legislative decisions, irrespective of its own beliefs
for "judicial review is not always a very efficient form of policy-making.").
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consequences of the modified pleading. Although it would be ideal for the
legislature to respond in a prompt manner, so that it may continue to act as a check
and to shield judicial overreaches, such as the one in question, a rash and
thoughtless response would only undermine the role and legitimacy of the
legislature as a politically accountable branch.
Although a quick fix would be ideal to the resulting tension that Twiqbal
creates within the judicial process, it would be more beneficial to restore and define
the Supreme Court's role and limitations pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
Exclusively resolving the effects of Twiqbal may alleviate existing controversies,
however, it will fail to preclude the judiciary from reinterpreting the procedural
rules in the future to modify established precedent, alter substantive rights, or
expand judicial authority.
Overturning Twiqbal is a short-term solution that neglects to focus on the core
issue at stake: should the judiciary be able to reinterpret the Federal Rules through
adjudication, although they have the capacity to construct and amend the rules
through a prescribed process? Accordingly, I propose the following amendment to
the modem-day Rules Enabling Act codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2072:
(d) Such rules, as referred to in (a) ["rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts
of appeals"], prescribed by the Supreme Court shall not be modified
through the adjudication process. A change in the legal standard of
the rules as proposed by the Supreme Court must be addressed
through a revision of the written rule.
This proposal ensures that the judiciary does not misappropriate the federal
rules of practice and procedure and that any modifications of the rule are employed
in a transparent and systematic manner. The Court is not forbidden from amending
the rules. Any changes must undergo the process of actually amending the rule,
rather than circumventing it.130 Moreover, the provision acts as a limitation as well
as a check in ensuring that the Supreme Court promulgates rules of procedure rather
than policy. 131
If the court were able to amend the rules through the adjudication process, the
significance of the 1988 amendments, revising the implementation section of the
Rules Enabling Act to open public access, would evade.132 Transparency is key. 133
130. Transparency is further illustrated by the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, furthering the
role of public participation. See Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 733, 735 (1995) ("With the amendment of the Rules Enabling Act in 1988 and the public opening of
judicial advisory committee meetings, the practical business of the judicial rulemaking bodies has changed
significantly ... a scholarly, deliberative enterprise now has many of the hallmarks of a congressional
committee legislative mark-up.").
131. See Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation
of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1330 (1993) ("Congress, under the Rules Enabling Act, possesses a
supervisory role of reviewing court-promulgated rules prior to their becoming law to ensure that such rules do
not trench on Congress's substantive law-making function. This allocation of authority is reinforced by the
judicial review process, which also ensures that the rulemaking allocation is not transgressed when the courts
exercise their rulemaking power.").
132. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988). Section 2073(c)(1) provides for public meetings and
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Congress granted the Court the authority of procedural rulemaking; it did not
bestow the capacity to use judicial interpretation to rewrite law in its understanding
or application. Twiqbal goes too far and masks the transparency that the
amendments intend.
Perhaps an analogy to the Congressional approach of legislation will further
illustrate this point. When Congress enacts law it is set forth in written text. In the
process of passing legislation, both houses hold hearings to qualify the application
and understanding of the potential law. After the enactment of the law, Congress
has the opportunity to change the law; any modification or development is
predominantly accomplished by a repeal or an amendment. Congress is not
permitted to "reinterpret" the law as they see fit, for that is the role of the Court.
Similarly, the Court should not be permitted to freely "reinterpret" the rules, at least
through the adjudication process.
One may then ask who is responsible for interpreting the Court's promulgated
rules, though it is unclear whether that role is even required. Federal rules of
practice and procedure are intended to be clear-cut and unambiguous, for such rules
are directed to alleviate the burdens within the judicial economy from an efficiency
standpoint. Preventing the Supreme Court from modifying the rules through
interpretation will persuade the judiciary, similarly to the legislature, to construct
intelligible and understandable rules, for if rules are ambiguous and subject to more
than one interpretation, efficiency will be difficult to effectuate.
CONCLUSION
Although scholars and political activists have engaged in endlessly listing the
advantages and disadvantages of Twiqbal's heightened pleading requirements,
identifying the pros and cons does not respond to the point in issue. The holdings of
Twombly and Iqbal were construed similarly to Conley: using judicial interpretation
to change existing written, procedural precedent.
The main issue is not that Twiqbal deviates from Conley's "no set of facts"
language, but that the court has used the adjudication process to circumvent the
amendment process. The Rules Enabling Act had a clear cut objective: to create a
more efficient approach to court processes, perhaps those who are most familiar
should be granted the opportunity to establish procedural rules. Efficiency was of
utmost importance, however, efficiency does not warrant the court to take short
cuts. I concur with Justice Stevens that Twiqbal is a "poor vehicle for the Court's
new pleading rule.134 Unless amended, rules are to be followed as they were
minutes of proceedings. Section 2073(d)(1) requires explanatory commentary for proposed rule revisions. An
attempt to require that the advisory rules committees consist of a "balanced cross section of bench and bar"
was deleted from the final 1988 revisions to the Rules Enabling Act.
133. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1724 (2004) (arguing that "the changes in the rulemaking process in
the 1980s that were designed to open it up to more and more diverse points of view, make it more transparent,
and diminish the need for congressional involvement, may in fact have facilitated a process of redundancy
wherein participants treat rulemaking that is at all controversial as merely the first act").
134. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586-87; see Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q.
297 (1938) ("[Rjules of procedure tend to assume a too obtrusive place in the attentions of judges and
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established, not when it is convenient to do so.
lawyers-unless, indeed, they are continually restricted to their proper and subordinate role.").
